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Abstract Today, it becomes more and more common to combine services from different
providers into one application. Service composition is however difficult and cumbersome
when there is no common trust anchor. Hence, delegation of access rights across trust
domains will become essential in service composition scenarios. This article specifies
abstract delegation, discusses theoretical aspects of the concept, and provides technical
details of a validation implementation supporting a variety of access controls and
associated delegation mechanisms. Abstract delegation allows to harmonize the
management of heterogeneous access control mechanisms and to offer a unified user
experience. The authors observe standardization efforts to reduce application and domain-
specific delegation mechanisms, but this variety is very unlikely to completely disappear.
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Why is delegation so cumbersome today?
Developing new services and applications typically involves composition of existing
services. Composition can result in a mash-up service, a workflow, or a plain
application. Typically the services to be composed come from different service
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providers. Such an application could end up with combining services e.g. from
Amazon, Microsoft, and Google. Each of these service providers controls its own
trust domain and in general there is no mutual trust between service providers. We
refer to this as a multi-domain scenario. Figure 1 gives an example use case for
delegation in a multi-domain service composition.
Usually the problem of mutual trust establishment is addressed by means of
manual exchange and identity tokens, such as X.509 certificates. The drawback is
that this gives the composition a somewhat static attitude. Service compositions have
to find a trade-off between level of security, dynamic composition, and manageability.
However, when it comes to personal or even business-critical information that is shared,
appropriate security mechanisms are essential. Since most scenarios do have security
requirements, it becomes difficult to compose services from different trust domains
because a) access control (AC) models are heterogeneous and b) there is no common
trust anchor. These are major roadblocks for service composition.
Further, we believe that due to the steadily growing number of individual online
services and their easy composability, delegation in multi-domain service compo-
sition will become an important requirement.
Fig. 1 Example use case for delegation in multi-domain service composition. Bob wants to invoke a
composed service that aggregates Alice’s data stored on two other services. All services are offered by
different service providers and may have different access control mechanisms in place. We assume that
there is no common trust anchor between all three providers. How shall Alice delegate access rights to her
data to Bob in an easy, user-friendly and secure way?
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Delegation of access rights generally requires user’s approval. This leads us to the
essential aspect of the user experience for delegation in composite services. There is
a large diversity of access control mechanisms, e.g. X.509-based access control lists,
SecPAL (Becker et al. 2007), username/password lists, and XACML (Moses 2005).
All these mechanisms require different handling, we call them management actions,
to be performed by the user. Additionally more and more industry APIs for
authentication are available, e.g. Amazon Web Services Authentication, Facebook
Authentication, Flickr Authentication API, Microsoft Live ID Delegation, and
OpenID. All authorization mechanisms have their individual strengths and may be
applied to guard individual services. Hence, the chance that a user deals only with
one access control mechanism is very unlikely. In reality the user is confronted with
a number of these access control mechanisms. This heterogeneity is a real issue. The
typical user will not want to learn how to configure each of them in order to protect
all her services, respectively learn how to give access to other persons. We see
efforts both in research (Patil et al. 2007) and standardization (Fitzpatrick et al. 2007;
Moses 2005; OAuth Core Workgroup 2007) to make different access control
mechanism interoperable. This may decrease the diversity, but it is obvious that the
variety of access control mechanisms will never totally disappear.
What end-users and software developers need is an abstraction layer that offers
delegation and hides the details of different access control mechanisms. This
abstraction layer has to be designed in a way that the user has a set of high-level
operations at hand which are common to all access control mechanisms. For
instance, the user expresses her wish to grant or revoke some right to a specific
service and the abstraction maps this to an operation on the access control
mechanism of this specific service. This abstraction solves in fact two problems.
First the user is able to manage the access control of all her services, which in turn
raises the user’s confidence and trust in the system. Second, this lays the basis for
delegation of access rights in multi-domain service composition scenarios without
embedding too many details regarding underlying mechanisms. Hence, it removes
the roadblock for multi-domain service compositions. We refer to this abstraction as
abstract delegation. This article describes and discusses the concepts and
implementation of this abstraction layer.
Definition of terms
This section defines the main terms that we will use throughout this article. Figure 1
shows the three actors of our scenario and their relation to each other: the delegator,
the delegatee and the resource. Without loss of generality we assume that the
delegatee invokes the resource. The resource is managed by the delegator. Moreover
we understand all three actors as generalized services; particularly the delegatee and
the resource may be part of a service composition. The next paragraph shall define
the three terms more precisely.
We define a resource as a service that is valuable for a user. Owning a resource
does not necessarily mean that user is also hosting the service. Think about an online
picture service that stores users’ digital picture collections. Although the user does
not own the picture service as such, she owns her photo collection at this service.
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Other examples are location services, electronic medical records, personal schedule
and agenda, etc. In pervasive computing environments, resources are also extended
to appliances ranging from lamps e.g. service controlling lighting at user’s home, to
cars e.g. service unlocking and starting user’s car.
Resources generally need mechanisms to enforce access control for obvious
security and privacy reasons including confidentiality. Access to those resources can
be delegated to third parties e.g. friend, hospital, housekeeping. We define a
delegator as an authorized entity a that can authorize another entity b to access a
given resource r with privileges that were previously explicitly or implicitly agreed
between a and b. We define a delegatee as an entity b that requests access to a
resource r and is authorized by delegator a. We call delegation the act of granting
access rights. Delegation could involve the creation of a new credential, uploading a
credential of b to an access control list, or modifying an existing security policy. We
do not focus on a specific mechanism here. Rather we suggest a framework featuring
a set of plug-ins where each plug-in allows the configuration of a specific access
control mechanism. Besides configuring the access control mechanism of r the
delegator provides information to the delegatee how to invoke the service. It is
important to understand that we do not aim at delegation by means of impersonation,
where an entity b temporarily acts as entity a.
We distinguish between two types of delegation, which should be supported by
any delegation mechanism for multi-domain service compositions. A delegation is
delegatee-driven if the delegatee asks the delegator for access to a resource. The
request can be static (defined in metadata of a composite service), dynamic (e.g.
required through a call-back mechanism), or upon request (directly required by the
delegatee without previous interaction). In contrast, a delegation is delegator-driven
if the delegator chooses to delegate some rights to a delegatee. Note that the request
could come from the delegatee in a non-formatted way that cannot be processed
automatically by the delegation system, e.g. as verbal request. The selection of the
delegatee can be preselected (e-mail/SMS asking for delegation), based on a list
(delegate to a friend/colleague), or based on discovery or enrolment mechanisms. We
expect the delegatee-driven delegation to become the most common form in service
compositions across multiple trust domains.
Another distinction is the type of delegation mechanisms, i.e. the type of access
control mechanism protecting the resource. They can be distinguished in three classes:
& Chain of Credentials: The delegator (or delegator-side Security Token Service)
creates a new security token that is provided to the delegatee. Examples for this
class are SecPAL and SPKI.
& Policy Manipulation: The delegator modifies the access control policy of the
resource. Examples for this type are modification of authorization policy at a
Security Token Service (STS) or at a Policy Decision Point (PDP), or adding an
identifier of the delegatee (e.g. X.509 certificate, username, corporate alias,
fingerprint) to an access control list (ACL).
& Hybrid: Combination of chain of credential and policy manipulation. For
instance, the delegator creates a new pair of credentials, registers it at the
resource, and provides it to the delegatee. In other cases, the delegator could ask
the delegatee to register/create an account before delegation.
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This solution covers all three types and most of the mentioned examples.
Abstract delegation
This section presents the architecture and implementation of a general framework
that allows delegation. In the opening section we argued, that on one hand users care
about privacy and want to control access to their data and services while on the other
hand, multiple access control mechanisms and associated management interfaces
coexist and lead to incoherent user experiences.
Approach
The abstraction covers delegatee, resource, rights, and revocation. The delegator is
thus able to specify — in a composition or using a unified user interface — that an
abstract delegatee has some access rights on an abstract resource. This abstract
delegation is mapped at runtime to a concrete mechanism. For instance, in order to
grant access an XACML policy could be modified or a new SecPAL credential could
be created and handed over to the delegatee. Abstract revocation of access rights is
also mapped to appropriate mechanisms, e.g. modification of a policy, or adding an
entry to a revocation list.
Figure 2 visualizes the conceptual idea of abstract delegation. The delegator
defines a delegation relationship between a delegatee and a resource. This is done by
means of an appropriate user interface which supports a high-level view and hides
the details from the delegator (unless the delegator wants to see them). Thus, the
delegator understands what is going on without caring too much about the technical
details. For instance, the patient Alice delegates read access for her medical record
service to a doctor called Bob (see Fig. 3). The abstraction allows Alice to refer to
‘Doctor Bob’ instead of to a specific piece of identity information like an X.509
certificate. Similarly, the resource is presented to the delegator in a semantically
meaningful way. It is not just an URL, but a rich set of information about the service.
The information about a delegatee is collected in a data structure that we call
delegatee card; likewise the information about a resource is captured in a resource
card.
Resource cards are data containers with all information necessary to access and
administrate a service. Resource cards should be issued and signed by resource












Fig. 2 Generalized scenario with three participants delegator, delegatee, and resource
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legacy services, which obviously do not provide resource cards, we assume that the
user or a third party would create the appropriate card. In more detail, resource cards
contain a unique resource identifier, visual information (friendly name, icon,
description, category of resource), resource description (resource type, resource
address, resource credential), and delegation info (max duration, rights that can be
delegated, management type, management address, management credential, dele-
gator’s credential for management). Resource card attributes can be optional if they
are provided as metadata by the resource and management interface. Some data, e.g.
user credentials, cannot be delivered by the service provider and hence must be set
by the user while installing the card, e.g. a reference to a key store.
Delegatee cards describe the delegatee and contains the following information: a
unique subject identifier, visual information (friendly name, icon, category of
delegatee), and a list of identifiers (X.509 certificates, user name in a specific scope,
fingerprint). It may contain multiple public identifiers for the same party. For
instance, Alice may know the X.509 certificate of Bob as well as Bob’s fingerprint
feature vector; Alice’s delegatee card for Bob would contain both identifiers. New
identifiers can be created, e.g. in an enrolment process, and existing identifiers can
be added, removed or modified. Delegatee cards can either be provided by the
delegatee or can be created by the delegator.
The actual mapping from the high-level abstract view to the low-level technical
authorization depends on the authorization model of the resource. The resource card
contains the information about the service’s authorization mechanism. This gives
the delegation framework sufficient information to execute what is necessary that the
service successfully authorizes the delegatee when he invokes an action on the
service. Figure 3 shows three mappings between the high-level delegation and
technical realization. Those three mappings are just examples and depend on the
technical implementation of the service’s authorization system.
Doctor Bob Alice’s Medical RecordCan Read
X.509 Certificate 
of Doctor Bob
Web Service at 
http://foo/bar
Modify XACML to 











Passw. for Doctor 
Bob
Specific file on 
FTP server
Add Bob’s Usern./
Passw. to ACL 
of the service
Three examples 
how to map abstract
delegation at 
runtime 








accepts this type 
of token
Fig. 3 Mapping between abstract delegation and three concrete actions
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Architecture
The architecture that implements the concept of abstract delegation consists mainly
of a delegation framework located at delegator’s side. Figure 3 shows the involved
components and the interactions between delegator, delegatee, and resource. The
delegation framework makes the abstraction for the user. It relies on resource cards
and delegatee cards.1 Based on these information it performs all necessary actions to
grant access to the delegatee. For the concrete delegation actions it relies on a set of
plug-ins. Each plug-in is specialized in a specific authorization mechanism (e.g.
SecPAL based policies, XACML, X.509 ACL). The framework needs a plug-in for
each authorization mechanism that one of the delegator’s resources might utilize.
The framework is enhanced with two user interfaces: the Delegation Selector, which
enables the delegator to select appropriate resource and rights to delegate (see
Fig. 5), and the Delegation Browser, which offers a holistic view of all ongoing
delegations (see Fig. 6).
The delegatee does not need a specific part of the delegation framework, but
needs to support the authorization protocol of the resource and has to deal with the
credentials provided by the delegator. But this is what the delegatee does even
without the delegation framework. The resource and its associated guard do not need
to fulfill specific requirements either.
Figure 4 depicts interactions between all actors and components. In step 1, the
delegatee requests access to a specific type of resource. Note that the delegator may
not have a priori knowledge about the expectation of the delegatee regarding access
to resources, e.g. a social network composite service may require access to the user’s
calendar to search for contacts. In this case, the delegatee (social network) would
expose meta-data regarding its expectation on required resources (access to a
calendar resource). The Delegatee Id as well as the Resource Description are
provided to the delegation framework. In step 2, the delegation request is compared
to available resource cards. Resource cards that match the request, i.e. same type of
service and supported delegatee, are presented to the delegator that selects the
resource he wants to delegate access to (step 3). This step involves the delegation
selector (see Fig. 5) which combines service discovery and delegation in a
CardSpace-like user experience.2 Step 4 does what is necessary to grant permission
to the delegatee to access the resource. The framework calls the plug-in referenced in
the resource card, which in turn performs the necessary actions on the resource
guard. Depending on the protocol used to manage the resource guard, additional
steps may be required for authentication and authorization purpose. The next section
will describes existing plug-ins and provide details on a concrete example. The result
of the delegation is provided to the delegatee in step 5: the delegator provides the
credential to be used for authorization and a description of the resource including its
address and the granted permissions. The credential can be a new one (e.g. a SecPAL
token) or a reference to a credential of the delegatee (e.g. its own X.509 certificate).
2 See http://www.microsoft.com/net/WindowsCardSpace.aspx
1 In the pilot implementation the delegation cards and resource cards are stored locally. This has the
obvious drawback that they are accessible only on the single machine where they are stored on. The
concept could be extended with a cloud based data store for these cards.
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Finally, in step 6, the delegatee accesses the resource using the received credential.
Additional steps may be necessary depending on the protocol used to access the
resource (e.g. WS-Federation, WS-MetadataExchange).
Delegation plug-ins
Since plug-ins map abstract delegation to concrete mechanisms, they have to deal
with different aspects of the abstraction:
& Delegation: mainly policy manipulation (management operations) vs. chain of
credentials (creation of credentials).
& Management channel: type of communication (e.g. WS-ResourceTransfer,
REST, Plain SOAP) and authentication to management interface.
& Resource: type of authentication mechanisms supported by the resource. This is
used to ensure that the delegatee gets enough information to access the resource.
The remaining of this section describes the function of plug-ins through an
example and next briefly describes few plug-ins we did implement to cover a large
variety of delegation mechanisms we are aware of, namely: PKI-based, WS-Trust
(STS), username/password-based ACL, Kerberos, claims-based Access Control, and
other authentication mechanisms (e.g. biometrics).
Matching in delegation plug-ins
We use the SecPAL plug-in to describe the abstract API and how the mapping from
abstraction to a concrete delegation mechanism is done. More information on the
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Fig. 4 Components and interactions
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For the sake of simplicity, we assume a scenario with basic resources and policies.
The resource is the medical record service3 (MedService) of the Alice (delegator)
implemented as a file server with two directories: file://Alice/general and file://Alice/
confidential containing general health information (e.g. blood group) and more
confidential data (e.g. complete blood analysis) respectively. The access control
policy controlling the medical record could be (in pseudo SecPAL):
This policy mainly states that any medical service or person (HealthActor) can
read general health information of Alice and that Alice can choose which medical
service or person can read her confidential health data. For completeness, the policy
also lists one medical service (HospitalX) and one medical person (DrBob), which is
are certified by the medical association.
When Alice uses a service offered by HospitalX to monitor her health, she will
get metadata specifying that full read access to some medical record is required.
Metadata is provided to the delegation framework, which loads all matching4
resource cards. In this example, we can assume that Alice is registered to only one
medical record service and thus we can skip the step of selecting the card. In the
3 Examples for health record service are http://healthvault.com/ and http://www.google.com/health
Fig. 5 The CardSpace-like Delegation Selector allows delegating access to own resources
4 The matching between the concrete resource and the description is out of the scope of this paper. Fore
more information, see (Bussard et al. 2008).
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delegation selector, Alice can verify the trustworthiness of the service offered by
HospitalX and can see which rights will be delegated.
Based on the resource card, the corresponding plug-in is loaded. The SecPAL
plug-in (as well as any other plug-in) implements the following interface:
GrantAccess is called with three parameters. AbstractDelegatee mainly contains a
credential of the delegatee, in this example a SecPAL Principal or an X.509
certificate. This credential is used for delegation, i.e. issuing a new SecPAL
credential for the delegatee in this example. ResourceCard provides additional
information about the resource to the plug-in, e.g. the resource address and the type
of access control management. AbstractPrivileges contains the rights to be granted,
i.e. read access to confidential part of a medical record. The plug-in will then handle
the delegation by creating one or more new claims:
The process of creating appropriated claims can be hard-coded in the plug-in and
configured by the resource card or can rely on an abduction query to discover
missing claims (Becker et al. 2009). Finally, plug-in creates a credential from the
necessary claims and hands it to the delegatee.
Existing Plug-ins
STS Plug-in Security Token Services (STS) implement WS-Trust (Nadalin et al.
2008) interface to issue and validate credentials. First, to validate the model, a
simple STS issuing SAML tokens based on an X.509 access control list was
developed as resource guard. We created a plug-in to let the delegation framework
deal with such delegation. When a delegation is invoked it takes the X.509 from the
delegatee card and adds this to the STS’s access control list. At invocation time of
the resource the delegator use his private key to authenticate. In order to revoke a
delegation the plug-in removes the X.509 from the STS’s access control list.
Next, to go further in the integration of standards and legacy management
application, we tested the delegation framework with the .NET Access Control
Service of the Azure Services Platform,5 a publicly-accessible STS offering a
management interface. Access to the resource was protected with this STS and the
plug-in had to be adapted to call the management API of this one. All necessary
inputs (e.g. address of the management endpoint) are part of the resource card.
SecPAL Plug-in In order to validate the model, a prototype resource protected by
SecPAL was implemented together with a SecPAL plug-in, which was used in the
delegation framework. The SecPAL policy associated with the resource stated that
someone owning a resource can delegate access to this resource. The delegator
5 See http://www.microsoft.com/azure/accesscontrol.mspx
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possesses a SecPAL token credential providing that she owns this resource. The
delegation framework creates a new credential stating that the delegatee can access a
subset of the resource for the required duration. The delegation credentials is
provided to the delegatee, who in turn presents it when invoking the resource. A
revocation of the access right is done by adding the issued delegation credential to a
revocation list.
Google Calendar Plug-in We chose the Google Calendar API6 to experiment with
the integration of non-SOAP legacy management interfaces. The plug-in maps a
delegation to management operations of the Google API. It essentially modifies
rights of delegatees to read the calendar of the delegator.
Fingerprint Plug-in This plug-in is not related to service composition, but has been
developed to look at resources that are not Web Services (SOAP or REST). In the
demo application the plug-in was used to control access to a car. The delegation
browser was used to specify that a delegatee ‘Bob’ can drive the car of the delegator
for the next few days while ‘Bob Junior’ can open the doors but may not start the
engine. The car application featured a fingerprint reader and individual access
control lists for opening the doors and starting the engine. The plug-ins management
operation consisted in uploading and removing the delegatees’ fingerprint feature
vector to the appropriate access control list.
Unified user experiences
In most cases, the delegatee is a service, e.g. mash-up or workflow, and thus does
not directly involve delegatee-side users. In this article, we focus on the user
experience of the delegator. When the delegatee is a human being, e.g. delegator
Alice grants access rights to delegatee Bob, then the user experience of the delegatee
becomes relevant. The delegatee may use an Identity Selector (e.g. CardSpace) when
accessing delegator’s resources. When the delegatee can delegate further, he acts as
delegator and may thus use a Delegation Selector. Combining Identity Selector and
Delegation Selector for such advance scenarios is an interesting option, but out of
the scope of this article.
Figure 5 presents the delegation selector, which appears in delegatee-driven
scenarios. In this sample, the user (delegator) is executing a sightseeing composite
service (delegatee) that requires access to the user’s real-time location (resource).
First, the user (delegator) is asked for a trust decision regarding the composite service
(delegatee). Her decision is based on PKI or reputation. Next, the delegation selector
highlights the list of resources (1) that match the composite service requirements (first
three cards are highlighted). In this example, the user is registered to three location
services: a service providing the location from a GPS device, a service delivering a
coarse-grained position based on the radio cell of user’s mobile phone (selected), and a
similar service that is protected by a SecPAL-based resource guard.
6 See http://code.google.com/apis/calendar/
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Before delegating, the user can see what rights she will grant (2). In this example
the delegate may invoke the operation GetLocation(Bob) but not the operation
GetSpeed(). Moreover the duration of the delegation is displayed. Finally, the user
simply proceeds and delegation happens without having the user dealing with the
underlying mechanisms.
A user experience has to deal with granting access but also with controlling
ongoing delegations. Figure 6 shows the Delegation Browser, an experimental user
interface to keep track of active delegations, to revoke them and to enable delegator-
driven delegation. Each column corresponds to a delegatee card and each row is
related to a resource card. The intersection between delegatee and resource provides
information on ongoing delegation, which is represented with different icons. The
browser shows details about a resource, delegatee, and delegation in the bottom part
of the window. Resources as well as delegatees can be grouped enabling a more
coarse grained view similar to the Expandable Grids by Reeder et al. (2008).
Related work
There is much prior art in the field of access control for web services. It can be
distinguished in four groups. The first group focuses on access control for individual
web services and strives to come up with policy languages, improvements in policy
Fig. 6 Delegation Browser is an experimental user interface to keep control over ongoing delegations
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decisions, or applies existing access control models to service oriented architec-
tures.7 The second group concentrates on access control for composite services in
intra-organization applications. Hence, these publications explicitly or implicitly deal
with scenarios where all services are inside a single trust domain. The third group of
publications considers composite services distributed over multiple trust domains,
but makes the implicit assumption or explicit proposal of a common authorization
mechanism to circumvent the interoperability issue. The last group summarizes prior art
that considers abstract management of access rights across multiple trust domains.
Policy languages
XACML (Moses 2005) stands for Extensible Access Control Markup Language. It is
a declarative access control policy language and a processing model, describing how
to interpret the policies. XACML has been widely adopted both by industry and
academics. However, XACML does not support delegation of authority. Many
publications (Lang et al. 2006; López et al. 2005; She et al. 2007; Yu 2006), which
we will discuss below, use XACML as basis for their work, build extensions on top
of it or provide interoperability.
SecPAL (Becker et al. 2007) is a declarative, logic-based security policy language
developed to meet the access control requirements of large-scale Grid Computing
Environments. It was designed to be comprehensive and provides a uniform
mechanism for expressing trust relationships, authorization policies, delegation
policies, identity and attribute assertions, capability assertions, revocations, and audit
requirements.
AC for service compositions within a single trust domain
Robinson et al. (2006) present an approach to “automatically derive the minimal
authorizations required for collaboration, as well as enable and disable the
authorizations in a just-in-time manner that matches the control flow described in
the choreography.” They use it for “runtime management of authorization policies”
of ad-hoc combined web-service, but the basic idea could be utilized as building
block in the approach described in this article.
The approach presented by Mukkamala et al. (2006) supports real ad-hoc
collaboration between services. The “dynamic coalition-based access control
(DCBAC) model facilitates the formation of dynamic coalitions through the use of
a registry service”. A central registry which is also responsible for authorization
decisions is used as trusted third party. A service registering itself at the registry may
upload its individual service policy, e.g. expressed with WS-Policy, which makes it
more suitable for single domain service compositions.
Wimmer et al. (2006) propose a formal model that allows the computation of a
summarized policy from a set of individual policies. It computes the least required
privileges for the execution of the composite application. They do not mention
delegation or answer the question how the set of individual policies is compiled in
the first place.
7 As example, we present only two prominent policy languages.
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AC for service compositions across different trust domain
The European project NextGrid8 focused on service level agreements in cross-
domain grid applications. NextGrid defines policy management operations that allow
delegation in Grid service environments (NextGrid 2008). The Grid framework
GRIA9 implements this delegation concept as part of process-based access control
(IT Innovation 2009). NextGrid defines standardized way to delegate access to
resources. The delegation framework we’re proposing could use the NextGrid
protocol in a dedicated plug-in and thus opening the delegation framework for Grid
services.
She et al. (She et al. 2007) recognize that access control for service composition
across multiple trust domains is not solved yet and come to the conclusion that
delegation of access rights will become an important mechanism for service
composition. Their approach is a “delegation-based security model [which] provides
the framework and defines the key processes to secure the web services through
issuing, sending, confirming, negotiating, and revoking the delegation tokens.” This
in fact means that all web services participating in this composition have to agree on
a single token-based authorization mechanism, in She’s case it is an extension of
XACML policies. We think that this is not practicable and that a delegation solution
has to integrate a large diversity of authorization mechanisms.
A case study how to integrate web services which are protected by XACML,
SAML and PERMIS and that span across multiple trust domains is presented by
López et al. (2005). They follow the same rational we give in this article: “standards
for authorization systems are less widely adopted and accepted, and tend to work
only within homogeneous systems”. López et al. base their integration on a
previously published Credential Conversion System (Cánovas et al. 2004). The
approach makes use of role-based access control, which in turn “leads to the
definition of loosely coupled multi-domain environments, where a predefined set of
role mappings to mediate inter-domain accesses is defined.” However, the solution
requires a high level of administration which makes it not suitable for ad-hoc
delegation.
Freudenthal et al. (2002) propose a model for distributed role-based access
control (dRBAC) in “coalition environments”. They describe a distributed network
of collections of delegation credentials, which they call ‘wallets’. “A trust-sensitive
system resource can query a wallet for proofs authorizing whether a requested access
is permitted.” The whole approach is similar to the SecPAL policy language (Becker
et al. 2007), which addresses the same question by means of a formal language
whereas dRBAC utilizes an infrastructure.
OAuth (OAuth Core Workgroup 2007) is an open source protocol that allows
users to delegate access to their resource to a delegatee.10 It explicitly covers the
situation that the delegatee is an application as well. The protocol keeps the
delegator’s identity and credentials confidential, which in fact allows anonymous
delegation. OAuth defines an access control and management mechanism, but does
8 http://www.nextgrid.org
9 http://www.gria.org
10 OAuth refers to resource as protected resource and to delegatee as consumer.
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not take into account the variety of existing solutions. Although it is based on well
established standards it needs to be widely adopted in order to have an impact and
thus adds to the diversity we described in the introduction.
Abstract management of access rights
Yu (2006) proposes a “reusable access control layer, which is separate from the web
services themselves. All web service requests pass through the authorization layer.
An authorization decision is made and passed onto the web service.” Apparently the
goal of this work is to have a central policy decision point which additionally
features an inference engine for policy decision. Although the authors touch
extensibility for other access control mechanisms, the nature of a central decision
point prevents this solution from being used in ad hoc service compositions.
Lang et al. (2006) present an approach for “multipolicy authorization” that allows
to use XACML and SAML in Globus Toolkit release 4, a middleware for computing
Grids (Foster et al., 2001). They abstracted a policy decision point (PDP) with an
object-oriented interface, which supports an abstract operation ‘canAccess()’. “Each
specific policy is a subclass of the PDP abstraction, which implements the common
interface inherited from PDP with its own policy and evaluation mechanism.” Our
approach also uses an abstraction for authorization management, but we offer an
improved flexibility by adding new resource cards and plug-ins.
Windows Live ID Delegated Authentication (Windows Live 2008) is “a way to
permit access to personal information, but with more precise control over access and
usage permissions than the [...] generally bad practice of handing over your account
credentials to another Web site.” This approach fully supports our point of combining
services from multiple trust domains. An interesting characteristic is to split the
delegation in two phases, the consent phase and the delegation phase, which allows that
the delegator needs to be online only for consenting. Windows Live ID Delegated
Authentication defines an interesting delegation mechanism, but does not take into
account the variety of existing solutions.
One of our former papers (Bussard et al. 2008) already motivates why abstract
delegation is required in service composition and how this concept could be used
with the SCENE infrastructure, a platform that supports the development and
execution of self-adaptable service centric systems. This former paper describes just
the high-level concepts and use-cases, but lacks deeper technical content. In this
article we explicitly focus on the technical details of abstract delegation, i.e.
delegation plug-ins, support for specific types of delegation, and user experience.
Moreover we present results from our validation implementation.
Concluding we can say that we are not aware of any prior art that allows
convenient delegation in multi-domain service compositions which regards the
existing variety of access control mechanisms.
Discussion
The proposed solution has a number of advantages over the current state of the art.
First of all, it solves the problem to allow delegation in multi-domain service
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compositions. Thus it removes the roadblock for service compositions that we
identified in the introduction as essential problem in today’s technology. It was
important to find a solution that does not define yet another access control
mechanism or policy language, but leverages multiple existing access control
mechanisms. The variety of plug-in we tested shows that the abstract delegation
works in wide range of technical scenarios. Moreover the solution allows the user to
manage and supervise delegation actions. A unique user interface controls all
delegations regardless of the underlying access control mechanism. The delegation
browser allows the grouping of resources and delegatees and thus provides a quick
general overview to the user. At the same time, it gives detailed information on every
single delegation and enables the user to grant and revoke rights in an easy and
unified way. We see the abstraction of access control and delegation mechanisms as
well as the unified user experience as the main contribution of this article.
The approach proposed in this article can be deployed without changing an
existing security infrastructure (STS, XACML PDP, etc.) or the resource. However,
end-users (delgators) require the delegation framework and its user interfaces.
Depending on the trust model, these components could be hosted in the cloud and
accessed with a web browser. At delegatee-side the composite applications must be
“delegation-aware” to benefit from the delegation abstraction.
The approach presented in this article does not impact existing Identity
Management Systems and thus does not introduce new scalability issues. However,
simplifying the way of querying authorization services and resources as well as
making users aware of delegation may lead to more queries than we see today. The
main performance issues we noticed during this work were on client-side when
updating simultaneously the status of tens of resources owned by a user (calendar,
location service, medical record, etc.). Running each query in a dedicated thread
enables update in a acceptable time (few seconds). Apart the framework itself, the
current implementation of the user experience, esp. the Delegation Browser, would
not be convenient with hundreds of resources. Better grouping mechanisms would
be necessary.
Certainly, our research is far from being complete. We see a number of
shortcomings that could be taken up and addressed by the research community.
First, the configuration of access control mechanisms becomes difficult in complex
scenarios where overlapping access rights are granted and revoked multiple times.
Second, we presented a way to keep track of ongoing delegations with the delegation
browser. It shows the current status of delegation, but does not keep track of the
history of delegations, which is especially important in case of dynamic issuance of
new claims, e.g. with SecPAL (Becker et al. 2007). Finally, from an ergonomic point
of view the CardSpace-like delegation selector was just an experiment. More work
on human computer interaction is necessary to understand what kind of interface is
most suitable.
Conclusion
We describe a delegation framework which allows delegation of access rights in
multi-domain service compositions. We explained why this is an essential
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requirement to improve the current state of the art. We describe a delegation
framework that is able to delegate access rights to a resource protected by an existing
access control mechanism. The two main advantages of the solution are a) that it
supports multiple existing access control solutions in a generic way and b) that all
delegations are performed and monitored trough a unified API and user interface,
regardless of the underlying access control mechanism. The article is completed by
an extended literature research revealed that this delegation capability is still lacking
although it is mentioned by some publications.
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